
The federal government has made it harder to follow the airplanes carrying people in Immigration and Customs Enforcement custody. It has also given a private company more responsibility for preparing the lists of people traveling on those flights.
Both changes appear in federal contracting records, which The Guardian examined and reported on November 18.
In September, ICE amended a contract with CSI Aviation to add a Federal Aviation Administration program that limits the flight information available on popular public tracking websites.
The agency also expanded CSI’s responsibilities for coordinating flights and preparing passenger manifests, work previously assigned to ICE personnel under the agency’s operational handbook and earlier contract terms.
These are administrative decisions, but they affect people trying to determine where someone in federal custody has been taken.
How the flights became harder to follow
Most commercial aircraft can be followed through websites such as Flightradar24 and FlightAware. These services allow users to identify an aircraft and follow its route, often while it is still in the air.
The FAA operates a program called Limiting Aircraft Data Displayed, or LADD, that allows qualifying aircraft information to be withheld from participating tracking services.
The program exists for legitimate privacy purposes. Congress authorized protections for private aircraft owners and operators conducting noncommercial flights. The FAA also maintains a separate request procedure for government, military, and law-enforcement aircraft.
In September, ICE amended its arrangement with CSI Aviation to include LADD.
According to Human Rights First’s ICE Flight Monitor, the change coincided with a substantial reduction in the information available through commercial flight-tracking websites.
Fetaine Seddighzadeh, who works with the monitoring project, told The Guardian that aircraft previously identifiable by their registration numbers became blocked in late September. By November 5, most ICE flights could no longer be followed through their call signs on those services.
That does not mean the airplanes have disappeared from radar. Other aircraft-tracking networks that collect publicly broadcast signals can still receive their positions.
But reconstructing the flights now requires considerably more work, and monitors sometimes cannot determine a flight’s destination until its route is complete.
That delay matters.
A flight’s destination can matter long before the plane lands.
Attorneys trying to protect someone from removal, families seeking a detained relative, and organizations monitoring compliance with court orders may need information during a transfer, not afterward.
The company now has a larger role
The flight-tracking restriction is not the only significant contract change.
ICE awarded CSI Aviation a noncompetitive staffing arrangement worth up to $305.7 million. The contract provides for up to 140 flight coordinators working at ICE offices and air operations hubs.
The agency justified the arrangement by citing increased operational demands, staffing limitations, and CSI’s existing systems.
On October 31, ICE also issued a new charter-flight order to CSI worth up to $1.28 billion over the following year.
Those are maximum contract values, not amounts already paid.
The new arrangements give CSI personnel greater responsibility for preparing passenger manifests.
Under ICE’s earlier procedures, agency employees prepared these lists. The new arrangements shift additional administrative work to the contractor.
Preparing a passenger list is not the same as deciding who may lawfully be deported.
In a November 12 filing in separate litigation involving earlier deportation flights, CSI maintained that ICE, not the company, determined which individuals boarded its aircraft.
That distinction is important. The available records do not establish that CSI has acquired legal authority to decide who should be removed from the country.
They do raise a question about how ICE ensures that court orders, removal restrictions, and other legal requirements are reflected in the records used to board passengers.
The federal government remains responsible for complying with those requirements, regardless of who prepares the paperwork.
Congress has already questioned the restrictions
The flight-tracking controversy did not begin with this week’s disclosure.
In May, 40 Democratic members of the House wrote to FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford seeking information about ICE deportation flights and the agency’s use of its privacy program.
The lawmakers asked whether the program was being used beyond its authorized purpose and requested detailed information about flight operations, including destinations and passenger totals.
Their letter was a formal oversight request. It was not a court order, and it did not compel an immediate change to the program.
Representative Rob Menéndez of New Jersey, who helped organize the request, told The Guardian that the administration had not provided satisfactory answers. He said the incoming Democratic-controlled House would pursue further oversight.
Meanwhile, Human Rights First has continued tracking deportation flights, using information available from other aircraft-tracking networks.
That work has not stopped, but it has become more difficult.
The restrictions remain in effect, according to the November 18 reporting. No public decision reversing them was identified, and the available evidence does not establish that the FAA has determined whether the specific applications comply with federal law.
Congress has asked for answers, but the tracking restrictions remain in effect.
What the law permits remains unanswered
The distinction between protecting an aircraft owner’s privacy and restricting the public’s ability to monitor government operations is central to this dispute.
Federal law provides privacy protections for private owners and operators conducting noncommercial flights. The FAA’s published guidance also establishes a process for government and law-enforcement requests.
But the records examined by The Guardian do not settle several questions about ICE’s use of those procedures.
Which aircraft were approved for restricted public display? Who submitted the requests? What legal basis did the FAA use to approve them? Were the affected flights covered by the relevant privacy protections?
These are questions about the application of existing law, not an assertion that a violation has already been established.
The government may have legitimate operational or security reasons for restricting particular information. Those reasons need to be examined against the authority Congress actually granted.
The documented effect, however, is clear: information that independent monitors previously obtained through commercial tracking services has become harder to access.
This reflects a concern at the center of the Pattern of Power: weakening the rule of law while claiming to defend it. Government procedures can be used in ways that make it more difficult for outsiders to determine whether officials are complying with the law.
In this case, the reduction in public visibility is documented. Whether ICE’s use of the privacy program exceeds its lawful authority remains unresolved.
What this means for Kentucky
Kentucky is already part of the federal immigration detention system. County jails hold people in ICE custody, and local law-enforcement agencies participate in federal immigration-enforcement agreements.
Those arrangements place Kentucky residents and institutions within a larger system in which detainees can be transferred between facilities or removed from the country.
No evidence in the new contracting disclosure identifies a particular Kentucky detainee or establishes that a specific flight from Kentucky was covered by the September restriction.
But the national policy raises a question relevant to every community participating in federal detention: what information remains available when a person leaves local custody and enters the federal transportation system?
Dispatches previously reported that ICE changed its public detainee locator in September, making the locations of many people with final removal orders harder to find.
The flight-tracking changes affect a different source of information. Together, they illustrate how separate administrative decisions can reduce the information available to families, attorneys and independent monitors.
One way to seek an answer
The Department of Transportation’s Office of Inspector General accepts public reports concerning potential mismanagement and violations of federal law involving transportation programs.
A citizen can use its official hotline to request a review of whether the FAA’s LADD program was properly applied to ICE contractor-operated deportation flights.
The request can identify the September 2026 contract modification, the November 18 reporting, and the eligibility requirements in 49 U.S.C. § 44114.
The Inspector General can evaluate the complaint, open an audit or investigation, refer it elsewhere, or decline further action. Filing a request does not guarantee an investigation or a change in policy.
That is a specific accountability mechanism available now.
The larger oversight question remains with the FAA and Congress.
Independent monitors have documented what has changed. Members of Congress have asked the FAA to explain the restrictions. Neither effort has produced a documented reversal yet.
Unanswered is who authorized these restrictions for ICE flights, what legal justification supported those decisions, and whether the FAA will make that information available for public review.
Sources
The Guardian, November 18, 2026. Jason Wilson, “ICE offers contractor operating deportation flights windfall and secrecy, data shows.” Original reporting examining federal contracting records.
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/nov/18/ice-deportation-flights-csi-deal
Federal Aviation Administration. Limiting Aircraft Data Displayed (LADD). Official program guidance, including eligibility and government-request procedures.
https://www.faa.gov/pilots/ladd
United States Code, Title 49, Section 44114. Statutory provisions governing aircraft privacy.
https://uscode.house.gov/us/usc/119-118/t49/s44114/
USAspending.gov. October 31, 2026, CSI Aviation charter-flight contract order.
https://www.usaspending.gov/award/CONT_AWD_70CDCR27FC0000001_7012_70CDCR24A00000001_7012
SAM.gov. July 2026 contracting justification for additional CSI Aviation flight coordinators.
https://sam.gov/opp/6adf07e86dcf418e92cc2cf225a3b2b8/view
The Guardian, May 11, 2026. Congressional letter raising concerns about tracking restrictions on ICE flights.
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/may/11/ice-deportation-flights-democrats-letter
Human Rights First. ICE Flight Monitor and reporting resources.
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/ice-flight-monitor
U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General. Public reporting hotline and complaint procedures.
https://www.oig.dot.gov/hotline
Dispatches from Kentucky, September 28, 2026. “ICE stopped showing where many final-order detainees are held.”
